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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - PREEMPTION OF STATE COM-
MON LAW ACTIONS AGAINST CIGARETTE MANUFAC-
TURERS BY THE FEDERAL CIGARETTE LABELING AND
ADVERTISING ACT: HAVE SMOKERS TAKEN THEIR LAST
PUFF TO HOLD TOBACCO COMPANIES LIABLE UNDER A
STATE TORT CLAIM? - Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc.
INTRODUCTION
Over a hundred suits against cigarette manufacturers are still
pending, but recent decisions may have slammed the door on these
tobacco liability cases.1 In 1964, the United States Surgeon Gen-
1. With attorneys for both sides claiming victory in recent tobacco liability
trials, the fate of other tobacco liability cases is unclear. In Horton v. American
Brands, docket no. 9050 (Circuit Ct., Holmes County), plaintiff sought 17 million
dollars in damages for the death of Horton, who died after thirty years of smok-
ing. On January 29, 1988, Holmes County Circuit Judge Gray Evans declared a
mistrial in the Horton case. Horton was the first case to be tried in a state with a
comparative-fault law and one of the few tobacco liability cases to be tried before
a jury. After deliberating for eight hours over a two-day span, the jury announced
it was deadlocked 7-5 in favor of the defendant. Nine votes were required for a
verdict. There were mixed opinions on whether the mistrial was a victory for the
industry or a positive omen for the plaintiffs. The tobacco industry considered it a
victory since the industry was not found liable in a state with a comparative fault
law. Others considered the result as a positive omen for plaintiffs since it was the
first time in the history of tobacco litigation that a jury failed to rule in favor of
the tobacco company. See Horton v. American Brands, Greensboro News and
Record, Jan. 30, 1988, at A2, col. 4 (Circuit Ct., Holmes County, Mississippi, Jan.
29, 1988).
A recent jury verdict in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, docket no. 83-2846
(D.N.J.), on remand from the Third Circuit, 782 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), for reso-
lution of certain issues, keeps the fate of tobacco liability cases engulfed in a
cloud of smoke. The verdict in Cipollone marks the first time in over three hun-
dred cases since 1954 that a tobacco company has lost even a single claim and has
been held liable for damages. In Cipollone, the plaintiff brought fraud and con-
spiracy claims against three tobacco companies-Liggett Group Inc., Phillip Mor-
ris Inc., and Lorillard Inc.-on behalf of his wife, Rose Cipollone, who died from
1
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eral released a report that was one of the first documents to scien-
tifically link cigarette smoking to the occurrence of lung cancer,
bronchitis, and emphysema.2 The public response to this report led
several states to enact mandatory warning labels for cigarette
packages sold within the state.' Recognizing the potential confu-
sion and conflict likely to result if each state enacted its own label-
ing requirements, Congress stepped in and enacted the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (the "Act").4 The Act's
lung cancer after forty-two years of smoking. Because Rose Cipollone had smoked
only Liggett brands before 1966, Liggett Group Inc. also faced additional charges
of failure-to-warn and warranty charges. On June 13, 1988, a federal jury found
the Liggett Group liable for failure to warn of the health risks of smoking before
the warnings were required in 1966 and for misleading the public through adver-
tisements before 1966. The jury concluded that Liggett's Advertising slogans
before 1966 such as L&Ms were "Just What the Doctor Ordered" misled the pub-
lic by suggesting that smoking was safe. The jury awarded Mr. Cipollone $400,000
in damages but did not award damages to Mrs. Cipollone's estate because it found
Mrs. Cipollone was mostly responsible for her death. The Liggett Group was also
charged with guaranteeing safety by express warranty in advertisements. How-
ever, the jury concluded that Mrs. Cipollone knew enough from reading and other
notifictions to have "unreasonably encountered a known danger" by insisting on
smoking before 1966. The jury concluded that Rose Cipollone was eighty percent
responsible for her death and Liggett Group was twenty percent responsible.
Under the New Jersey law, Mrs. Cipollone was not entitled to damages unless the
tobacco company was fifty percent to blame.
Attorneys for the Cipollones were the first to obtain and introduce in court
confidential tobacco studies on the dangers of smoking. These secret studies were
the basis of the fraud and conspiracy claims. However, the jury, not swayed by
these confidential reports, dismissed the fraud and conspiracy charges. Therefore,
Phillip Morris Inc. and Lorillard Inc. were exonerated of any blame in Rose Ci-
pollone's death. The impact that these confidential documents will have on pend-
ing cases remains unclear because each case has its own merits and each jury may
not reach the same verdict. See WINSTON-SALEM JOURNAL, June 14, 1988, at 1,
col. 3.
A Philadelphia jury concluded in Gunsalus v. American Tobacco Company, a
case involving tobacco and asbestos, that the American Tobacco Company was
not liable in a former shipyard worker's long cancer death. However, the jury did
find that the Company should have put warning labels on cigarette packs before
1966. No damages were awarded because the cigarettes were not a substantial
factor in the death. See WINSTON-SALEM JOURNAL, June 25, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
2. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, & WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH, RE-
PORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC
HEALTH SERVICE (January 11, 1964) [hereinafter 1964 SURGEON GENERAL'S
REPORT].
3. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 399 (McKinney 1984): New York state
legislation requiring label: "WARNING: Excessive Use Is Dangerous to Health."
4. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79
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purpose was to establish a uniform, nationally consistent system to
regulate cigarette warning labels and the advertising and promo-
tion of cigarettes.6 After the passage of the Act, cigarette manufac-
turers successfully fought liability suits on the ground that the Act
preempts state law damage actions relating to smoking and health
that challenge either the adequacy of the warning6 or the propriety
of a party's actions "with respect to the advertising and promotion
of cigarettes." 7
In Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc.,' the First Circuit Court of
Stat. 282 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 Act] (codified as amended by the Public Health
Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970) at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1331-1340 (1982) [hereinafter 1969 Act]). In 1984, Congress further amended
the Act by the Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. No. 98-474, 98
Stat. 2200 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 Act] (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341
(Supp. IV 1986)).
5. The Act as amended by the 1969 Act included the following statement of
purpose:
It is the policy of the Congress, and the purpose of this chapter, to
establish a comprehensive Federal Program to deal with cigarette label-
ing and advertising with respect to any relationship between smoking
and health whereby -
(1) the public may be adequately informed that cigarette smoking
may be hazardous to health by inclusion of a warning to that effect on
each package of cigarettes; and
(2) commerce and the national economy may be (A) protected to the
maximum extent consistent with this declared policy and (B) not im-
peded by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and ad-
vertising regulations with respect to any relationship between smoking
and health.
1969 Act, § 1331, supra note 4.
In October, 1984, part (1) was amended with an added reference to uniform
notices in cigarette advertising. Paragraph (1) of § 1331 now reads:
(1) the public may be adequately informed about any adverse health ef-
fects of cigarette smoking by inclusion of warning notices on each pack-
age of cigarettes and in each advertisement of cigarettes ..
1984 Act, § 1331(1), supra note 4.
6. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1984),
rev'd and remanded, 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 907
(1987); accord, Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D.
Tenn. 1985), appeal docketed, No. 86-56072 (6th Cir., Jan. 20, 1986). On June 14,
1988, the Sixth Circuit holding that warning labels on cigarettes preempt most
aspects of tobacco liability dismissed Roysdon's fifty-five million dollar liability
suit. Roysdon, No. 86-5072 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1988).
7. Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187.
8. 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987). It should be noted that, because the amend-
ments of the 1984 Act took effect after Joseph Palmer's death, they are not con-
1988] 469
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Appeals held that the Act preempted a suit for damages against
cigarette manufacturers and distributors on a state common law
theory of inadequate warnings.9 The Palmer decision established
that the mandated federal warning labels on cigarette packages are
sufficient to protect tobacco companies from smokers' claims that
the label fails to warn adequately of health dangers. The Palmer
court reasoned that allowing the Palmers to bring suit under state
law would excessively disrupt the calibrated balance between
health protection and trade regulation hammered out by Congress
in the Act. 0 The Eleventh Circuit, in Stephen v. American
Brands, Inc.,1 recently made a similar ruling.
This Note will examine the Act and the scope of its preemp-
tion provision. In addition, this Note will illustrate how the Palmer
court analyzed prior cases to elevate the immunity of cigarette
manufacturers and will also review the status of the law prior to
and after Palmer. The main thrust of this Note is how the Palmer
decision, by driving another nail in the preemption coffin for state
common law claims against cigarette manufacturers, effectively
slammed the lid on these cigarette manufacturer liability suits and
requires dismissal of future suits based on inadequate warning
labels.
THE CASE
On August 26, 1980, Joseph C. Palmer of Newton, Massachu-
setts, died at age forty-nine, allegedly from lung cancer.12 On Au-
gust 19, 1983, Ann M. Palmer, individually and as administrator of
her late husband's estate, and her mother-in-law filed this diversity
action in the District Court of Massachusetts. 3 The Palmers
brought a state common law action against Liggett Group, Inc., 4
and Liggett and Myers Tobacco, Inc.,' 5 alleging that "liability
should be imposed on Liggett because of its failure to warn ade-
trolling in this case.
9. Id. at 626.
10. Id.
11. 825 F.2d 312 (11th Cir. 1987). See also Roysdon, No. 86-5072 (6th Cir.
Tenn. 1988).
12. Palmer, 825 F.2d at 622.
13. Id. For the district court's opinion, see Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 633
F. Supp. 1171 (D. Mass. 1986).
14. Liggett Group, Inc., is a Delaware corporation.
15. Liggett and Myers Tobacco Co., Inc., is a tobacco company of Durham,
North Carolina.
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quately of the health consequences of cigarette smoking.""6 The
Palmers' original complaint stated three causes of action: violation
of the Federal Hazardous Substance Act 17; common law negligence
in not making cigarettes safer and in failing to provide adequate
warnings; and breach of implied warranties of merchantability and
fitness. 18 Later, plaintiffs amended their complaint by adding a
claim under the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act 9 alleging
defendants' conduct caused substantial injury to consumers and
constituted an unfair trade practice.20 The trial judge dismissed
the claim under the Federal Hazardous Substances Act because
cigarettes do not fall within the definition of hazardous substances
under the statute.21 The bottom line to the Palmers' suit was that
Liggett was negligent in failing to give adequate warnings about
the dangers of cigarette smoking and that this negligence proxi-
mately caused Mr. Palmer's death.22
Liggett answered with a motion to dismiss all inadequate
warning claims on the ground that the Act preempted these
claims.23 The district court denied Liggett's motion to dismiss. 2 4
The district court judge held that the preemption issue involved a
"controlling question of law"25 and certified sua sponte the issue of
preemption to the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit.26
Judge Brown, Senior Circuit Judge, reviewed the construction
of the Act, the effect of preemption on the claim, and the opinion
of the district court.2 7 The United States Court of Appeals for the
16. Palmer, 825 F.2d at 622.
17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1276 (1982 and Supp. IV 1986).
18. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-314 et seq. (Law. Co-op 1984).
19. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 93A (Law. Co-op 1985).
20. Palmer, 633 F. Supp. at 1172, n.1.
21. Id.
22. Palmer, 825 F.2d at 622.
23. Id. The district court, in analyzing the Act, concluded that "Congress
[could not have] meant, by its silence on the issue of common law claim preemp-
tion, to do away with all means of obtaining compensation for those hurt by inad-
equate cigarette warnings and advertising." Palmer, 633 F. Supp. at 1173. In ar-
riving at this conclusion, the district court relied heavily on Judge Sarokin's
analysis employed in the district court opinion of Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
593 F. Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1984), rev'd and remanded, 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 907 (1987).
24. Palmer, 825 F.2d at 622. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (Supp. II 1984).
25. Palmer, 825 F.2d at 622.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 621. The court of appeals, holding that the Act impliedly pre-
1988]
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First Circuit reversed and remanded the decision of the district
court, holding that the Act preempted the Palmers' smoking- and
health-related claims challenging the adequacy of the federally
mandated warning labels or the propriety of Liggett's advertising
and promotion of its cigarettes."8 Underlying the court's decision
was deference to the congressional declaration in the Act that
packages of cigarettes be uniformly labeled and a balance be struck
between the government's concern for the national health policy
through education and the priority of the trade and commerce as-
pects of the tobacco industry.29
BACKGROUND
The doctrine of preemption 0 is rooted in the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution.1 Chief Justice Marshall
first recognized the preemption doctrine in Gibbons v. Ogden. 2
Preemption "is compelled whether Congress' command is explicitly
stated in the statute's language or is implicitly contained in its
structure and purpose. ' ' s3
The release of the Surgeon General's report in 1964 s3 linking
smoking to cancer and other diseases produced a public outcry.
State governments, rushing to protect their citizens, proposed their
empted the Palmers' claims, decided not to overturn that part of the lower court's
decision which concluded that 15 U.S.C. § 1334 did not expressly preempt the
Palmers' claims. Id. at 625.
28. Id. at 625. See supra note 5 for text of the Act's policy and purpose
provisions.
29. Palmer, 825 F.2d at 621.
30. Preemption is defined as the "[d]octrine adopted by [the] U.S. Supreme
Court holding that certain matters are of such a national, as opposed to local,
character, that federal laws preempt or take precedence over state laws." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1060 (5th ed. 1979).
31. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The supremacy clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
32. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 202 (1824). See also Fidelity Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n
v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-53 (1982) (supremacy clause is foundation of
preemption doctrine).
33. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977), reh'g denied, 431
U.S. 925 (1977).
34. 1964 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 2.
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own separate cigarette warning legislation." This resulted in di-
verse and conflicting health warnings throughout the United
States. Congress responded by establishing a comprehensive na-
tionwide system of cigarette labels with the passage of the Act in
1965.36
The Act mandates that a conspicuous specific warning label
appear on all cigarette packaging.3 7 The original Act set forth the
following warning label: "Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Haz-
ardous to Your Health."3 " Since the Act's inception, the language
of the warning labels has been amended twice in recognition of the
fact that the link between smoking and health hazards has become
more firmly developed through scientific research and testing. In
1969, Congress changed the warning label by requiring the follow-
ing language: "Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined
that Cigarette Smoking is Dangerous to Your Health." 9 In 1984,
Congress replaced the previous warning and adopted four rota-
tional warnings to be employed by each cigarette manufacturer in
an alternating sequence quarterly."0
The purpose of requiring a uniform system of labeling was to
allow Congress to achieve its objective of striking a balance be-
35. See supra note 3 for an example.
36. 1965 Act, supra note 4.
37. Id. The 1984 amendments added the requirement that a warning label
also be placed on cigarette advertisements. 1984 Act, § 1331, supra note 4.
38. 1965 Act, § 1333, supra note 4.
39. 1969 Act, § 1333, supra note 4.
40. 1984 Act, § 1333, supra note 4. Although the 1969 warning controlled the
disposition of this case, the 1984 warnings are set out below for informative pur-
poses since the Palmers relied on the 1984 warnings to show the inadequacy of
the prior warnings. The 1984 rotational warnings are:
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING:
Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Disease, Emphysema, And
May Complicate Pregnancy.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING:
Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces Serious Risks To Your
Health.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING:
Smoking By Pregnant Women May Result in Fetal Injury, Prema-
ture Birth, and Low Birth Weight.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING:
Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon Monoxide.
1984 Act, § 1333(a) and (c), supra note 4. See also 1984 Act, § 1331(a)(1), supra
note 4 (embodying the requirement that one of these four explicit warning labels
appears in rotation on cigarette packages and cigarette advertisements).
19881
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tween two policies: protection of the public health through ade-
quate warnings and protection of the national economy through
uniform labeling requirements.41 To enforce the goal of uniformity
of labeling, Congress in 1965 drafted a specific preemption provi-
sion in section 1334, which provided:
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the
statement required by section 1333 of this title shall be required
on any cigarette package.
(b) No statement relating to smoking and health shall be required
in the advertising of any cigarettes the packages of which are la-
beled in conformity with the provisions of this Act.42
In 1969, Congress amended subparagraph (b) of section 1334 to
provide that:
(b) No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health
shall be imposed under state law with respect to the advertising
or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled
in conformity with the provisions of this Act."
The United States Supreme Court employs several general
principles of preemption to determine whether Congress intended
to prevent state authority from enacting its own separate legisla-
Stion in a particular area. These principles focus on whether Con-
gress preempts the state law by either express statement 4' or an
implicit barrier to state regulation. 5 Courts often divide implied
preemption into subcategories to describe situations that trigger
implied preemption. Generally, the courts label these subcategories
as either "fully occupied," "conflict," "impossibility," or "frustra-
tion of purpose."
Implied preemption occurs when Congress "occupies" the field
in a particular area. Congress may occupy a particular field in
three ways. First, "[t]he scheme of the federal regulation may be so
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no
room for the States to supplement it."' 46 Second, "the Act of Con-
41. 1969 Act, § 1331, supra note 4. See supra note 5 for text of policy and
purpose provision.
42. 1965 Act, § 1334, supra note 4.
43. 1969 Act, § 1334, supra note 4. The 1969 Act also deleted § 1334(c)-(d) of
the 1965 Act.
44. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 512, 525.
45. Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
46. Fidelity Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S., 141, 153
(quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
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gress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant
that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of
state laws on the same subject.' 7 Third, Congress occupies a field
when "the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the
character of the obligations imposed by it may reveal the same
purpose.""
Where Congress has not fully occupied a given field, implied
preemption may still occur if there is a "conflict" between the fed-
eral and state regulation. The state law will be impliedly pre-
empted "to the extent that it actually conflicts with a federal
law."' 49 Such a conflict arises when "compliance with both the fed-
eral and state regulations is a physical impossibility"50 or when the
state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. '51
However, in applying these preemption principles to a specific
area, a court must consider the overriding presumption that "Con-
gress did not intend to displace state law." 52 Because our federalist
system is designed to prevent the federal government from over-
stepping its bounds, federal courts are reluctant to imply a con-
gressional intent to preempt state law absent explicit statutory
language.53 However, every circuit court that has addressed the
preemption issue has concluded that the state law tort claims at-
tacking both the adequacy of the congressionally mandated warn-
ing label and the propriety of the tobacco manufacturer's advertis-
ing and promotion of its cigarettes are preempted." In reaching
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & De-
velopment Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983). See also Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663
(1962).
50. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963).
51. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
52. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981); see also Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230.
53. Id. See also City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 316 (1981) (feder-
alism creates a presumption against preemption of state law, including common
law).
54. See, e.g., Stephen v. American Brands, Inc., 825 F.2d 312 (11th Cir.
1987); Cipollone, 789 F.2d 181. For a district court decision holding state law
claims are preempted see Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp.
1189 (E.D. Tenn. 1985). The Sixth Circuit has also recently joined the First, the
Third, and the Eleventh Circuits in holding that warning labels on cigarettes pre-
empt most state law claims based on inadequate warnings. Roysdon, No. 86-5072
19881
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their conclusions, the courts looked to the history and language of
the Act. Most courts generally approach the preemption question
by ascertaining whether the claim is barred by either express pre-
emption or one of the subcategories of implied preemption.5 5 Al-
though courts agree that the preemption analysis is the appropri-
ate method for resolving these claims, the courts have not reached
a uniform final result. Palmer gave the First Circuit a prime op-
portunity to clarify the scope and impact of the Act on state tort
claims.
ANALYSIS
In Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc.,56 the Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit held that the Act preempted the Palmers' smok-
ing- and health-related claims challenging the adequacy of the fed-
eral warning on cigarette packages and the propriety of Liggett's
advertising and promotion of cigarettes.57 Giving deference to the
congressional policy, the court concluded that introduction of such
state claims would excessively disrupt the calibrated balance that
Congress achieved through a uniform cigarette labeling system. 8
Circuit Judge Brown, writing for the court,59 reviewed the language
and history of the Act60 and then scrutinized the district court's
opinion61 by employing the express and implied preemption analy-
sis. The court, after concluding that the Palmers' state claims were
impliedly preempted, addressed the remaining contentions raised
by the Palmers on appeal.2 First, the court rejected the Palmers'
contention that, if the court preempted their state-based tort suit,
it would "effectively - and wrongly - leave plaintiffs like the
Palmers without any remedy for their injuries."6 3 Second, the court
addressed and rejected the Palmers' contention, with which the
district court agreed, that "the effect of compensatory awards on
(6th Cir. Tenn. 1988).
55. See, e.g., Cipollone, 789 F.2d 181; Roysdon, 623 F. Supp. 1189.
56. 825 F.2d 620.
57. Id. at 621.
58. Id.
59. Circuit Judge Bownes and Circuit Judge Torruella joined Senior Circuit
Judge Brown's opinion.
60. Palmer, 825 F.2d at 622-25.
61. Id. at 625-6; Palmer, 633 F. Supp. 1171 (relying heavily on the analysis
used by the district court in Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. 1146).
62. 825 F.2d at 626-28.
63. Id. at 626-27.
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defendants' behavior is indirect and not regulatory in nature."'"
Finally, the Palmer court dismissed as unpersuasive65 the analogies
of the present case to the Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co."6 and
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. 7 cases. Recognizing that this case
turned on a question of statutory construction and interpretation,
the Palmer court looked to the actual words of the Act to discern
the Act's meaning and effect.68
A. Preeminence of Preemption
The Palmer court, recognizing that preemption is strictly con-
strued because of the presumption against it, decided to base its
decision on implied preemption.6 9 The Palmer court did not over-
turn the district court's conclusion that the preemption provision 70
was not explicit enough to expressly preempt state-based claims. 1
However, the language of the preemption provision indicates that a
court possibly could rule that a state tort claim based on inade-
quate warnings is expressly preempted. The Act expressly states
that no smoking and health warning other than that drafted by
Congress shall be required.72 This explicit language leads to the
conclusion that any additional warning requirements imposed by
the states would be in direct contravention of the Act. Most pre-
64. Id. at 627.
65. Id. at 628.
66. 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
67. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
68. 825 F.2d at 623.
69. Id. at 625.
70. 1969 Act, § 1334, supra note 4. The language of this provision as origi-
nally enacted provided:
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the state-
ment required by section 4 of this Act shall be required on any cigarette
package.
(b) No statement relating to smoking and health shall be required in the
advertising of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in con-
formity with the provisions of this Act.
1965 Act, § 1334, supra note 4.
In 1969, section (b) was amended to read:
(b) No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be
imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of
any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the
provisions of the chapter.
1969 Act, § 1334, supra note 4.
71. 825 F.2d at 625.
72. 1969 Act, § 1334, supra note 4.
1988] 477
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emption arguments have focused on the fact that the Act does not
include either a clause explicitly preempting state claims73 or a
savings clause7 4 expressly preserving the state tort claims. Thus,
the discussions surrounding the lack of explicit reference to state
common law are significant only because of the presumption
against preemption. 5
The United States Supreme Court recognizes that Congress
may preempt state common law as well as statutes or regulations.70
The legislative history of the Act's preemption provision supports
express preemption of state common law claims. The Senate ver-
sion of the preemption provision specified that the Act's preemp-
tion provision would only apply to "State statute or regulation.
177
Congress rejected the Senate's version 8 and used the much
broader phrase "under State law."'79 Many decisions of the United
States Supreme Court also support express preemption, holding
that common law is a form of "state law."80 Therefore, the Palmer
court could have concluded that the Palmers' state claim was ex-
pressly preempted since the legislative history indicates that the
term "state law" encompasses "state common law." Instead, the
court decided not to delve into the legislative history to determine
congressional intent but simply to acknowledge that the preemp-
tion provision reads "no requirement . . . shall be imposed under
State law?' and not that "[s]tate-based tort claims are hereby pre-
empted." 81 Therefore, the court left open the question of whether a
73. See, e.g., Copyrights Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (Supp. II 1978); Em-
ployer Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) & (c)(1)
(1976); Domestic Housing and International Recovery and Financial Stability Act,
12 U.S.C. §§ 1715z-17(d), 1715z-18(e) (Supp. II 1984).
74. See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §
653(b)(4) (1982).
75. 789 F.2d at 185-86 n.5.
76. See, e.g., Chicago & Northwestern Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S.
311 (1981). See also, Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 403 (1963) (congressional
authority to preempt state law applies equally to both the legislative and judicial
branches of state governments).
77. See H.R. REP. No. 897, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1970); S. REP. No. 556,
91st Cong. 1st Sess. 16 (1969); 115 CONG. REc. 38, 732 (1969).
78. Id.
79. Id. See also 1969 Act, § 1334(b), supra note 4.
80. Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 403; Fidelity Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v.
De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153; San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359
U.S. 236, 246-7 (1959).
81. 825 F.2d at 625. But see Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 185 (court stated section
1334 does not provide for express preemption of the Cipollone's state common law
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state tort claim could be expressly preempted.
Next, the Palmer court turned its attention to whether the
Palmers' claims were impliedly preempted. Although the district
court divided implied preemption into four subcategories - occu-
pation of the field, conflict, impossibility, and frustration of pur-
pose - the appellate court stated that such labels were not neces-
sarily helpful or determinative in ascertaining preemption. 2
Rather, "the gist of preemption is whether Congress (expressly)
did or (impliedly) meant to displace state law or state law concepts
in enacting the federal law."' 83 Instead of trying to fit the Act into
one of these pre-cast molds, the Palmer court determined that the
critical inquiry was the effect that suits like that brought by the
Palmers would have on the federal scheme Congress laid out in the
Act. 4 Thus, regardless of the label attached to the claim, if the
state law excessively disrupts the congressionally declared scheme,
the state law will be preempted. 8
Congress clearly declared its reasons for enacting the Act
through the actual words in both the statement of purpose" and
the preemption provision.87 Congress's purpose was two-pronged.
It wanted first to inform the public that "cigarette smoking may be
hazardous to health by inclusion of a warning to that effect on
each package of cigarettes"88s and, second, simultaneously to pro-
vide that "commerce and the national economy. . . [be] protected
to the maximum extent consistent with this declared policy" and
not be impeded "by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette
labeling and advertising regulations . "..."89 As stated by the
Palmer court, "in drafting the Act, Congress had two policies -
health protection (through education) and trade protection - to
implement, but only one purpose: to strike a fair, effective balance
between these two competing interests."9
claims).
82. 825 F.2d at 625.
83. Id. at 625-26.
84. Id. at 626.
85. Id.
86. 1969 Act, § 1331, supra note 4. See supra note 5 for text of purpose
provision.
87. 1969 Act, § 1334, supra note 4. See supra note 70 for text of preemption
provision.
88. 1969 Act, § 1331(1), supra note 4.
89. 1969 Act, § 1331(2), supra note 4.
90. 825 F.2d at 626.
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The Palmer court focused its attention on the language of sec-
tion 1331, which measured the relative weight of these two policies:
"the federal warning should protect commerce 'to the maximum
extent' consistent with its health policy."9 The language of section
1331(2) indicates that the policy to protect commerce could be
viewed as subordinate to the health policy. Congress, carefully
weighing these two policies, crafted a warning that would protect
commerce but would not impinge on the health policy to warn the
public that smoking is hazardous to health. Noting that Congress
had fought a hard, bitterly partisan battle in striking the fragile
balance, the Palmer court concluded that the effect of allowing a
state-based tort claim would excessively disrupt the calibrated bal-
ance struck by Congress.9" Writing for the First Circuit, Judge
Brown stated, "[ilt is inconceivable that Congress intended to have
that carefully wrought balance of national interests superseded by
the views of a single state, indeed, perhaps of a single jury in a
single state."93
The Palmer court abandoned the categorical labeling ap-
proach used by other courts94 to determine if a state claim is im-
pliedly preempted. Instead, in determining that the Palmers'
claims were impliedly preempted, the court chose to ascertain the
intent of Congress by focusing on the actual language of the Act
and by examining the impact a state tort claim would have on
Congress's intent. Therefore, the Palmer court's analysis in deter-
mining that Congress intended to supersede the state law in the
cigarette labeling and advertising area is consistent with the Act.
B. Remaining Contentions
The Palmer court did not stop after holding that the Palmers'
claims were impliedly preempted; it further addressed other issues
raised on appeal.95 The court took advantage of the opportunity to
91. Id. At the time the Act was originally adopted, tobacco ranked third in
agricultural export products and fifth among all cash crops and supported some
750,000 farming families. See 825 F.2d at 622 n.2. See also 111 CONG. REc. 13,950,
13898 (1965) (remarks of Senators Ervin and Bass).
92. 825 F.2d at 626.
93. Id. at 626.
94. See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236; Ste-
phen v. American Brands Co., 825 F.2d 312 (11th Cir. 1987); Cipollone, 593 F.
Supp. 1146, rev'd and remanded, 634 F.2d 186 (3d Cir. 1987); Finberb v. Sullivan,
634 F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1980); Palmer, 633 F. Supp. 1171 (D. Mass. 1986).
95. 825 F.2d at 626-28.
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clarify some of the confusion in cigarette smokers' suits by charac-
terizing the nature of the activity involved, examining the effect of
compensatory damage awards, and distinguishing cases on which
smokers primarily relied.
First, the Palmer court rejected the Palmers' argument that
by dismissing the state-based tort claims the court would "effec-
tively - and wrongly" leave the plaintiffs without a remedy for
their injuries.9 The Palmers premised their argument by relying
on Justice White's statement in Silkwood that "it is difficult to
believe that Congress would, without comment, remove all means
of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct.' 97 The
Palmers argued that, if the Act were read to preempt state tort
claims, the court would give the Act an impermissible interpreta-
tion because state tort compensation is traditionally left to state
regulation.' 8
The Palmer court rejected this argument for several reasons.
The court distinguished smokers' claims from other claims held
not to be preempted: "cigarette smoking, at least initially, is a vol-
untary activity."" Those cases the Palmers relied on in which state
tort claims were not preempted involved victims who had little or
no choice in their participation in the regulated fields. 00 A second
reason for the court's rejection of the argument was that the
United States Supreme Court often dismisses suits, leaving parties
without a remedy by finding state law is preempted.' Even if the
federal law eliminates state remedies, there is no constitutional
mandate that the federal law "either duplicate the recovery at
common law or provide a reasonable substitute remedy."'0 2 The
96. Id. at 626-27.
97. Id. at 626-27 (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. at 251).
98. 825 F.2d at 627.
99. Id. However, some commentators have suggested that a possible theory to
hold cigarette companies liable is to assert failure of cigarette companies to warn
of the addictive quality of cigarette smoking. See Garner, Cigarette Dependency
and Liability: A Modest Proposal, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1423 (1980).
100. 825 F.2d at 627. See, e.g., Silkwood, 464 U.S. 238 (1984) (nuclear energy
development); United States Construction Workers v. La Burnum Construction
Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954) (employment).
101. 825 F.2d at 627. See Kalo Brick and Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311 (finding that
Interstate Commerce Act preempts a state common law action for damages
against a railroad); Farmer Union v. WDAY, 360 U.S. 525 (1959) (finding that the
Federal Communications Act preempts state libel claim against a radio station).
102. 825 F.2d at 627 (quoting Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 88 (1978)).
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Palmer court's holding leads to the logical conclusion that state
tort claims involving injuries sustained by a person who voluntarily
chose to smoke should be dismissed.
Since Palmer and its predecessors involved victims who began
smoking and became addicted after Congress required the warning
label, one open question is what the appellate courts would decide
if a smoker who began smoking and became addicted prior to the
Act seeks to bring a state tort claim. In the leading case of Green
v. American Tobacco,10 3 the plaintiffs sued on theories of breach of
implied warranty and negligence. Even though the Green case pre-
ceded the Act, the tobacco company still prevailed. The Green case
and others that followed it during the late 1950s and early 1960s
employed doctrines of foreseeability and assumption of the risk to
exclude tobacco companies from liability.10 4 The outcome of these
cases suggests that a suit brought today by or on behalf of someone
who smoked before passage of the Act would still be unsuccessful
on the merits since the tobacco company could use as a defense the
assumption of the risk.10 5 As to the preemption issue, if the Act
were not in effect at the time the person began smoking and be-
came addicted, then the courts should not be able to rely on the
Act to preempt state tort claims based on inadequate warnings or
failure to warn. 06 Allowing the state tort claim in this situation
would not violate the policy of the Act because it would not cause
tobacco companies to change their warning labels.
Second, the Palmer court rejected the Palmers' contention
that a compensatory damage award would only indirectly affect a
103. 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962), question certified on rehearing, 154 So. 2d
169 (Fla.), rev'd and remanded, 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963), rev'd and remanded
on rehearing, 391 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1968), rev'd per curiam, 409 F.2d 1166 (5th
Cir. 1969) (en banc), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 911 (1970).
104. Comment, Products Liability - Can It Kick the Smoking Habit?, 19
AKRON L. REV. 269, 273-80 (1985-86).
105. While assumption of the risk may be an effective defense when the vic-
tim is a smoker, it may not be effective in a case involving a non-smoking victim.
106. See Comment, supra note 104, at 290 for discussion of a 1985 case where
a California jury found that the tobacco company was not liable for the death of a
sixty-nine-year-old man who allegedly had smoked a Reynold's brand of cigarette
since he was a teenager. The trial judge in that case ruled that the 1964 Surgeon
General's report was inadmissible as hearsay and plaintiff's attorney could not
pursue the role of advertising. But see Cipollone, docket no. 83-2864 (D.N.J.) (at-
torneys for plaintiffs are allowed to present evidence that tobacco companies
helped cause Rose Cipollone's death by their failure to warn before 1966). See
Winston Salem Journal, Feb. 2, 1988, at 5, col. 6. See supra note 1.
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cigarette manufacturer's behavior and would not be regulatory in
nature.1 0 7 By challenging the adequacy of the label required by the
Act in a state action, the plaintiff would be claiming that the to-
bacco companies owe consumers a duty to place a more stringent
warning on its cigarette packages. Thus, requiring a more stringent
label would be regulating the tobacco manufacturer's conduct. The
Act expressly states that no other warning other than that required
by the Act shall be required." 8 The Palmer court recognized the
logical conclusion that compensatory awards would cause the to-
bacco manufacturer to change the warning requirements. "If a
manufacturer's warning that complies with the Act is found inade-
quate under a state tort theory, the damages awarded and verdict
rendered against it can be viewed as state regulation: the decision
effectively compels the manufacturer to alter its warning to con-
form to different state law requirements as 'promulgated' by a
jury's findings."10 9 If the Palmer court allowed the Palmers' suit
and the jury subsequently determined the federal warning to be
inadequate, in effect a single state judiciary could impose addi-
tional, nonuniform, diverse, and confusing label requirements.
Therefore, the state judiciary could indirectly accomplish what
fifty state legislatures could not do directly in contravention of the
Act.110 The Act's preemption provision expressly prohibits "state
law," not just "statutory law," from imposing any "requirement or
prohibition" different from the precise language of the Act's warn-
ing label."1
Although the Palmers and those similarly situated have main-
tained that compensatory awards would not compel the manufac-
turer to change its label because the choice of reaction would be
entirely the manufacturer's prerogative," 2 this argument lacks
logic since it would be ridiculous for the manufacturer not to take
steps to prevent further liability. The Palmer court accurately
summarized the cigarette manufacturer's position when it stated
"[t]his 'choice of reaction' seems akin to the free choice of coming
up for air after being underwater [sic]. '' s Further, the United
States Supreme Court acknowledged the regulatory nature of com-
107. 825 F.2d at 627.
108. 1969 Act, § 1334, supra note 4.
109. 825 F.2d at 627.
110. Id. at 628. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331(2) and 1334.
111. 1969 Act, § 1334, supra note 4.
112. 825 F.2d at 627.
113. Id.
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pensatory awards in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Gar-
mon. 1" The Garmon Court stated that: "[riegulation can be as ef-
fectively exerted through an award of damages as through some
form of preventive relief. The obligation to pay compensation can
be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct
and controlling policy.""' Thus, labeling a state requirement as a
"choice" does not reduce its impact on Congress's purpose. Al-
lowing a jury to find the federal warning inadequate forces the cig-
arette manufacturers that sell on a national scale either to craft a
warning that meets the requirements of each of the fifty states'
diverse tort laws or have fifty separate warnings. This result di-
rectly contravenes the expressed purpose of the Act to provide a
uniform system to protect the national economy and commerce. " "
Third, the Palmer court took the opportunity to distinguish
the Silkwood"7 and Ferebee"8 cases, on which the Palmers and
the district court relied. " 9 District courts have misconstrued the
Silkwood opinion to find that the Act does not preempt state com-
mon law claims. 2 ' Silkwood involved the preemptive effect of the
Atomic Energy Act (AEA)"' on state tort claims seeking punitive
damages for tortious acts of nuclear power plants. The Palmer
court found significant the fact that the AEA contains no preemp-
tion provison whatsoever. 22 The AEA expressly reserved signifi-
cant authority to the states,123 unlike the Act's sweeping preemp-
114. 359 U.S. 236.
115. Id. at 247. See also International Paper Co. v. Ouellettes, 107 S. Ct. 805
(1987) (Vermont law required more stringent standards than those required by
the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 and Supp. III 1985)). Thus,
the mill in Ouellette could comply with the Clean Water Act and pay state law
tort damages or change its behavior to comply with both the federal law and the
more stringent state law. However, the United States Supreme Court ruled that
Vermont law was preempted because it upset the balance addressed by the [Clean
Water] Act).
116. 1969 Act, § 1331(2), supra note 4.
117. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
118. 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
119. 825 F.2d at 628.
120. See, e.g., Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1984), rev'd and re-
manded, 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986).
121. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2284 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
122. 825 F.2d at 628.
123. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2019 (AEA does not affect state authority with
respect to generation, sale, or transmission of electric power through the use of
federally licensed nuclear facilities); 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (federal-state agreements
authorized so that states may assume regulatory authority over certain nuclear
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tion provision, which fails to provide any role for states in cigarette
labeling and advertising. Further, the AEA has been amended 12 4 to
allow explicitly the continuation of state common law actions for
injuries caused by nuclear operations. Therefore, reliance on
Silkwood as authority that state common law actions are not pre-
empted under the Act is misplaced. The only issue decided by
Silkwood was whether punitive damages were preempted.
125
Ferebee,1 6 the other preemption case relied on by the district
court, held that Maryland tort claims were not preempted by the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)."7
FIFRA imposes an entirely different regulatory scheme than that
imposed by the Act.128 Under FIFRA, each manufacturer can draft
its own warning and, if approved by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), the warning can be used even though another man-
ufacturer may use a different label.1 29 Further, Ferebee was distin-
guishable because the statute involved permitted states to impose
more stringent constraints on the use of EPA-approved pesticides
than those imposed by the EPA. "' In contrast, the Act explicitly
applies only to cigarettes, mandates specific language of the warn-
ing, and prohibits any state from playing any role in cigarette
warnings.' 3 '
While the Palmer court addressed most of the issues raised in
the district court, it failed to address the impact, if any, of the
Smokeless Tobacco Legislation.'3 ' The district court indicated that
this legislation supported the Palmers' suit.13 However, since the
First Circuit did not address this issue, the question remains open
on what impact, if any, the Smokeless Tobacco Legislation would
materials); 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (section does not affect state authority to regulate
activities for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards).
124. Price-Anderson Act, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1982 & Supp.)) See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, 464
U.S. at 251-256.
125. 464 U.S. 238.
126. 736 F.2d 1529.
127. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
128. 825 F.2d at 628-29 n.13.
129. 7 U.S.C. § 136.
130. 825 F.2d at 628-29 n.13.
131. Id. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1331.
132. Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-252, 100 Stat. 30 (1986) (codified as modified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4401-4408
(Supp. IV 1986)).
133. 633 F. Supp. at 1177 n.4.
19881
19
Greene: Constitutional Law - Preemption of State Common Law Actions again
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1983
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
have on state tort claims not involving smokeless tobacco.
CONCLUSION
In Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc.,"" the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit held that the federally mandated
warning labels on cigarette packages are sufficient to protect to-
bacco manufacturers from smokers' claims that the labels fail to
warn adequately about the harmful effects of cigarette smoking.
After reviewing the Act and placing primary emphasis on the ac-
tual language used in the purpose provision and the preemption
provision, the Palmer court determined that the Palmers' state
tort claims were impliedly preempted.
By holding that the Palmers' state tort claims were pre-
empted, the court preserved that delicate balance between the
public health interest and the national economy that Congress ex-
pressly drafted into the Act. After reaching the decision, the
Palmer court took the opportunity to address remaining conten-
tions raised on appeal to clarify the confusion surrounding smok-
ers' common law claims against tobacco companies. The Palmer
decision, by giving deference to Congress's intent for enacting the
Act, effectively laid to rest smokers' common law claims based on
the theory of inadequate warnings in the preemption coffin. Thus,
Palmer clearly established that, whether the smokers' claims are
based on state statutory law or state common law, tort claims on
the theory of inadequate warnings should be dismissed.
Lora B. Greene
134. 825 F.2d 620.
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